Thursday, April 9, 2009

Protecting Human Stories

William Cronon's "The Riddle of Apostle Islands" (pp. 167-177) is about protecting human stories. It's about the silliness of federal regulations, and it is against creating illusions of "wildness." I get all that, but I still find it difficult to get very worked up about the author's main thesis. And, judging by the author's own language -- "Why does this bother me so much?"-- Cronon seems to acknowledge as much. He knows people probably aren't going to care as much as he does about this topic.

I like the concept of "rewilding," and there certainly is value to making it clear that people have, for example, changed the landscape of the Apostle Islands. What we see, Cronon points out, isn't virgin wilderness. It's been "touched" by man, and there's no reason to try to imagine otherwise. In fact, clinging to the idea of the virginal can have dangerous consequences. True enough, but if I were going to visit the Apostle Islands, I'd probably be there for nature -- not for the cultural experience.

Do I care about Bill and Anna Mae Hill, and who planted the apple trees fifty years ago? Not really, but maybe that's just me. Like Cronon, I don't see the value in expunging their existence from the historical record, but I also don't see a lot of value in going out of our way to save evidence that they existed...

A Vinyl Killer


Sandra Steingraber ("The Pirates of Illiopolis," pp. 268-283) is making an appearance at RCTC tonight, which prompted me to skip ahead in The Future of Nature to read her article.

Illiopolis is a small town between Decatur and Springfield, about 90 minutes from the town I grew up in. It's a pretty boring part of Illinois, actually, but it sure must have been a hoping place a few years back when the PVC plant blew up...

Is there more cancer in the community? Apparently no one has bothered to check. Is vinyl a dangerous product to make? Apparently so, but no one seems to care enough to do much about it.

The article mentioned the accident at Graniteville, South Carolina. This one killed a few people, and shut down the local community college for a week. I know, because I worked there at the time. Graniteville is South Carolina's version of Illiopolis: poor, run-down, and overlooked.

You know why no one cares about PVC and cancer and small town America? The short answer is money. Places that house chemical plants don't have any. The makers of chemicals have all the political pull.

And nobody ever bothers to think that the product they're walking on is dangerous.

Saturday, April 4, 2009

Socrates--a gadfly martyred for free speech?

I find it interesting that Gross portrays Socrates as a martyr for freedom--specifically freedom of speech. I submit that Socrates was not a martyr or a "gadfly" in the sense of a Thoreau, Gandhi, or Martin Luther King. Socrates was indeed a "gadfly"but in what sense? Was Socrates' purpose in his role as a "gadfly" to awaken the city of Athens as a dissident, whistleblower, maverick (after this past election, I loathe this word), or revolutionary? Was Socrates an advocate of free speech as such? Or, was Socrates a problem for Athens because it was his charge, given by the god, to live the life of the philosopher by examining himself and others--in the process inviting, or teaching by his example, his chosen young men to question (hence, a corrupter of the young) the legitimacy of the common opinions that were the glue that held the city together (see 18b,19b,23b,and 24b to see what opinions Socrates was thought to have subverted).

Now the Athenian jurors had at least three choices or alternatives in dealing with Socrates. They could have changed their way of life in order to accord to Socrates' view of the life well-lived, they could silence him, or they simply could have tolerated him. Is toleration of Socrates the best choice Athens could have made and would Plato have agreed? John Stuart Mill, in his On Liberty, assumes that the trial, conviction, and execution of Socrates is an instance of what might happen if complete freedom of speech is not allowed. Socrates is portrayed by Mill, and by Gross, as a defender of an open society in which all are free to think and speak as they wish unrestricted by the city or community. But is this consistent with Socrates' teaching in the Crito-- which Gross claims (how he arrives at this I fail to see) is a dialogue with a "classic formulation of the doctrine of 'civil disobedience'? This is not the message of the laws Plato relates through Socrates in the Crito--which Socrates accepts--for he refuses on the grounds of justice his friends' pleas to escape with no consideration for the laws of Athens. Consider, too--Athens had allowed Socrates to live to 70, which suggests that Athens did possess a certain amount of patience.

Is there evidence in Plato's Apology, giving an account of the trial of Socrates, to support this view? Remember that Socrates claimed to be wiser than all those he has encountered in Athens, because Socrates, unlike the leading citizens of Athens and their claims, at least knew that he knew nothing (21a-22e). So, in his questioning of these individuals and the cherished religious and moral beliefs of Athens, might we infer that Socrates was asking the Athenians to be tolerant of a variety of opinions no matter how startling and new?

Or, was Socrates actually taking an intolerant position himself? By claiming that those who think they are wise are really not and that he himself is wise in knowing that he knows nothing, Socrates is assuming that he knows what it means to know. In other words, in order to recognize and expose ignorance, Socrates must have certainty of his own standards of truth--he presupposes that one can know what wisdom is (17a-b, 22c-e). Socrates, then, never advocates freedom to pursue one's own truth per se. Rather, Socrates argues for the best kind of life--that of the philosopher--who searches, but perhaps never possesses, the truth. And living the best life for humans, sadly, is not possible for the vast majority of us.

For example, is the Socratic way of life a model to be emulated? Plato's dialogues do not tell us to live as Socrates lived. Socrates' way of life is possible because he was possessed of a "daimonic" gift and a charge from the god--do we possess such a gift and charge? Perhaps the dialogues teaching, then, is not live as Socrates lived, but live as Socrates tells us to live. And given Socratic irony and his tailorng of his teaching to the nature of the soul of his interlocutors, this is not as easy to discern as one might suppose--including Gross who neatly packages "Socrate's way" into seven neat and tidy "master keys" allowing us to use our mind to the utmost. There is a reason why Socrates was suspicious of writing (it is equally accessible to all and it does not know to whom to talk to and to whom to be silent because it says the same thing to everyone) that points to the heart of his teaching--it is not democratic; we are not all possessed of souls capable of Socrates' attention and the Platonic dialogues reflect this understanding.